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Introduction
The U.S. New England groundfish fishery exploits demersal marine groundfish re-
sources off the U.S. east coast from Maine to Virginia. This fishery has been an im-
portant source of jobs and income for coastal communities in the Northeast region,
in particular, New England. However, the fishery resource base has declined to an
all-time low in the last three decades. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) re-
search trawl vessel surveys have documented a declining trend in the abundance of
this groundfish resource from 1963 to the present (USDC 1995). The potential ben-
efit of successful management is great: “Overall groundfish landings were one-third
the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Landings for haddock and yellowtail floun-
ders were one-tenth the MSY. If the abundance of groundfish were rebuilt to provide
MSY, the catch could increase by two to three times with one-half of the present ef-
fort” (Anthony 1993). The potential gains in resource rents and consumer benefits
from efficient exploitation of the New England groundfish resources by the commer-
cial fishing industries was estimated to be roughly $130 million and $20 million a
year respectively (Edwards and Murawski 1993).
The New England Groundfish fishery has been managed under the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act since 1977 (more recently the
Magnuson-Stevens Act). While fishery resources have been severely overfished,
some important new management actions have been taken in recent years. This ar-
ticle presents a review of the management system of the groundfish fishery to date,
with a focus on the role of the overfishing definition and management guidelines.
Also included is a description of an economic assistance program that was specifi-
cally designed to be parallel to an implementation of a new management system to
mitigate the management impact on the industry.
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Management System1
First Groundfish Fishery Management Plan (1977–82)
Under the Magnuson Act, in March 1977, NMFS adopted and implemented the first
groundfish Fishery Management Plan (FMP) proposed by New England Fishery
Management Council (Council). The management plan included catch quotas for
cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder along with other measures, e.g., minimum fish
sizes, minimum mesh sizes and spawning-area seasonal closures. Under this FMP,
the number of U.S. vessels increased dramatically as the Magnuson Act eliminated
foreign fishing. The increasing number of U.S. vessels caught the quotas rapidly and
forced the fisheries to close frequently and for long periods of time.
To prevent extended closure periods and allow small boats to catch their histori-
cal share, a system of individual vessel trip limits was added to the catch quotas.
Trip limits were eventually abandoned because of wholesale violations and inad-
equate resources to enforce the management regulations and rules. The industry
called for less restrictive regulations devoid of quotas and closures. The Council re-
sponded with a new FMP, commonly referred to as the interim groundfish FMP.
Interim Groundfish FMP (1982–86)
In order to mitigate the management problems, the Council began to prepare an in-
terim groundfish FMP in 1980 that was adopted in 1982 for a limited 3-year span,
under a premise that a more comprehensive management plan would be developed in
the next three years. The interim FMP replaced the catch quotas with minimum fish
size and net mesh size regulations for Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine. Also
included was a controlled framework to allow small-mesh fisheries, e.g., whiting
and shrimp fisheries, to continue in the Gulf of Maine. The measures proved ineffec-
tive with an eventual rise in fishing exploitation, an increase in landings, and a con-
current decline in resource abundance.
Comprehensive Groundfish FMP (1986 to Present)
To follow on the interim FMP, a comprehensive groundfish FMP was implemented
in 1986. This groundfish FMP set biological targets in terms of maximum spawning
potential (%MSP), based on spawning biomass per recruit analysis. The FMP was
also expanded to include more species in the management unit: cod, haddock, pollock,
white hake, redfish, winter flounder, winter flounder, American plaice, witch flounder,
and windowpane flounder. Yet, this FMP continued a management system and measures
that were similar to those adopted in the Interim FMP. The important measures were
minimum fish size, minimum mesh size, and spawning area regulations, as well as a
framework for regulating small-mesh fisheries. Direct controls on catch or fishing
effort were not included. Although this FMP was amended several times, the amend-
ments generally fine-tuned the existing system under the interim FMP and added
more groundfish species into the management unit. The fishery remained open to ac-
cess with a nominal and unrestrictive requirement for vessel permits.
One important feature of this FMP was that it instituted a Groundfish Technical
Monitoring Group (TMG) consisting of NMFS and state biologists to monitor the
1 The material in this section is primarily drawn from Wang (1993).Thalassorama 363
performance of the FMP. In 1988, the TMG issued a report indicating that the FMP
failed to protect major groundfish resources, i.e., cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounders from overfishing.
602 Overfishing Guidelines
In July 1989, the NMFS issued a set of management guidelines for overfished re-
sources, called the 602 overfishing guidelines. These guidelines required an over-
fishing definition to be specified for every fish stock in FMPs, and directed the
Councils to design and propose a stock rebuilding program for any stock that is
overfished by the definition (NMFS 1989; Rosenberg et al. 1994). The Council,
against a backdrop of the 602 guidelines and the TMG report, developed Amend-
ment 4 to the groundfish FMP. Adopted in 1991, Amendment 4 included the over-
fishing definition for most of the regulated groundfish species. By those definitions,
all stocks of cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder were overfished. However, it did
not include a stock rebuilding program for overfished stocks.
Consent Decree
Following the NMFS approval of Amendment 4, NMFS was sued by the Conserva-
tion Law Foundation (CLF) for implementing Amendment 4 that did not prevent
overfishing of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder stocks, as required in the 602
guidelines. A court settlement in the form of a “consent decree” was reached be-
tween NMFS and CLF to reduce the groundfish fishing mortality by 50% in a 5-year
rebuilding schedule. In response to the consent decree, the Council prepared and
submitted Amendment 5 to the groundfish FMP.
Amendment 5 to the Groundfish FMP (1994–95)
The main purpose of Amendment 5 was to eliminate the overfished condition of the
principal groundfish stocks (cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder) by reducing the
fishing mortality by 50% over the next 5–7 years (NEFMC 1993). In pursuing its
objectives, the Council amendment expanded the management unit to include all
stocks of cod, haddock, pollock, yellowtail flounder, winter flounder, witch floun-
der, windowpane flounder, American plaice, redfish, white hake, red hake, silver
hake, and ocean pout. Further, the amendment included the following components as
the core management system for the resource: (i) A moratorium on the issuance of
additional vessel permits during the rebuilding period of 5–7 years, with exceptions
for smaller and lower power vessels; (ii) an effort control system allocating and lim-
iting individual vessel days-at-sea (DAS); (iii) an effort reduction program to reduce
the initial vessel days-at-sea allocation by 10% each year and down to 50% of the
initial allocation in five years; (iv) a continued mesh-size regulation scheme for ves-
sels retaining more than the groundfish “possession limit” that was set at 500
pounds; (v) an interim sink gillnet regulation to reduce harbor porpoise bycatch us-
ing four-day blocks of time during which all gear must be out of the water; (vi) the
mandatory reporting of landings and fishing data by groundfish dealers and vessels
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Amendment 7 to the Groundfish FMP (1996 to Present )
While Amendment 5 was under development, the stocks of cod, haddock, and yel-
lowtail flounder continued to decline in abundance. In mid 1994 as Amendment 5
was being implemented, the latest stock assessments documented that haddock
stocks were at a record low level, two yellowtail flounder stocks (Southern New En-
gland and Georges Bank stocks) had collapsed and the collapse of the Georges Bank
cod stock was imminent. In August 1994, based on stock assessment reports, the
NMFS Northeast Fisheries Science Center issued a Special Advisory Report. This
special report stated that the fishing mortality for the final year of the 5-year re-
building schedule under Amendment 5 would not prevent the stocks from further de-
cline. It also advised that fishing mortality rates should be reduced to as low a level
as possible, approaching zero, to avert a collapse of cod and improve the prospects
of rebuilding the yellowtail flounder stocks. Further, the status of other groundfish
stocks were also considered depressed with many of the stocks being overexploited
(NEFMC 1996). This resulted in the Council initiating Amendment 7 with an objec-
tive “to reduce fishing mortality on Georges Bank cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounder and southern New England yellowtail flounder to as close to zero as practi-
cable, and also to reduce fishing mortality for Gulf of Maine cod to rebuild the
spawning stock biomass of the identified stocks” (NEFMC 1996).
Amendment 7 was approved and implemented in May 1996. It extended the ex-
isting measures of Amendment 5. The limited access permit was expanded to cover
more small groundfish otter trawl and gillnet vessels from 45 down to 30 feet. The
days-at-sea reduction schedule was accelerated, shortened by 2 years from a 5-year
schedule under Amendment 5 to a 3-year schedule under Amendment 7.
Some new precautionary measures were added to the above fine-tuned mea-
sures. Total allowable catch (TAC) targets for the commercial sector were set for
specific cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder stocks (five stocks in total), and an
aggregate TAC for the combined stocks of the other regulated species (seven other
groundfish species). If an individual stock or aggregate TAC is reached in any period
(e.g., year), the Council must take actions to restrict catch in the next period. A sec-
ond measure established a Multispecies Monitoring Committee (i.e., a groundfish
monitoring committee) consisting of industry representatives and assessment scien-
tists from NMFS, states and the Council. This committee is charged to track days-at-
sea and TAC utilization, assess the groundfish stocks, and make proposals on neces-
sary adjustments to the management measures relative to the FMP objectives.
Thirdly, a certification of a bycatch fisheries program was put in place to minimize
bycatch and the mortality of regulated groundfish. This provision assures that ves-
sels without groundfish days-at-sea quotas are not allowed to fish in northeast
groundfish fishing areas unless the NMFS Regional Administrator certifies that the
vessels involved can achieve a groundfish bycatch less than 5% of their trip catch.
Economic Assistance Program
The U.S. Department of Commerce, the supervisory agency of National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency
(NOAA), initiated two economic assistance programs parallel to, but independent
of, Amendments 5 and 7. In 1994, the first program was initiated to mitigate the im-
pact of Amendment 5 on fishing industries and communities. This economic assis-
tance program, consisting of a $30 million grant, was designed to assist fishing in-
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(i.e., underutilized species and aquaculture), improving fishery infrastructure, train-
ing fishermen for alternative jobs, and promoting community development.
The second program under implementation is a voluntary vessel buyback pro-
gram for reducing the fishing capacity of the groundfish fleet. The buyback pro-
gram, with a budget of $25 million, has two parts: a pilot project of $2 million, and
a follow-up project of $23 million. The pilot project, which has been completed, was
to establish program procedures and identify evaluation criteria. Detailed procedures
are now available and used in the second project. The procedures include the
owner’s proposal for selling his groundfish vessel to the U.S. federal government
with a proposed vessel price. One criterion to establish the vessel purchase priority
is the ranking of the vessels by the ratio of the vessel’s groundfish revenue to pur-
chasing price; the higher the ratio, the higher the priority for the vessel to be bought
by the federal government. With a $2 million budget, the pilot project bought and
retired eleven groundfish vessels with a total of 911 GRT, 4355 horsepower and
2106 vessel days-at-sea. With a linear extrapolation, the $25 million budget is esti-
mated to retire 11,388 GRT, 54,438 horsepower and 26,325 days-at-sea. The esti-
mated days-at-sea quota to be retired is approximately 20% of total days-at-sea
quota under Amendment 5.2
Summary
New England groundfish management has changed over time and evolved to a pro-
gram that addresses some of the fundamental problems of resource management.
This groundfish management is an example of a U.S. fishery management program
that has dealt with overutilized groundfish resources since the Magnuson Act was
implemented with limited success. The Act and the 602 overfishing guidelines,
along with the involvement of the public, have altered the strategy for managing
New England groundfish fisheries. The new fishery management program is differ-
ent from the traditional program in that it includes an overfishing definition for each
groundfish stock, a stock rebuilding time schedule with an overfishing threshold
level, a limited access program, a vessel days-at-sea quota system with a days-at-sea
reduction schedule, and necessary enforcement, monitoring, and evaluation systems.
Also included in the strategy are two economic assistance programs to mitigate the
impact of the management program on the industries and to reduce the fishery har-
vesting capacity of the fisheries. These include a $30-million grant to mitigate the
economic impact and a $25-million vessel buyback project to reduce the harvesting
capacity.
References
Anthony, V.C. 1993. The State of Groundfish Resources Off the Northeastern United States.
Fisheries 18(3).
Edwards S.F., and S.A. Murawski. 1993. Potential Economic Benefits from Efficient Harvest of
New England Groundfish. North American Journal of Fish Management 13(3):437–49.
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 1989 Guidelines for Fishery Management Plans,
50 CFR Part 602, July.
New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC). 1993. Amendment 5 to the Northeast
2 The estimated 26,325 DAS quota to be retired under the $25 million vessel buyback program accounts
for about 30% of the DAS quota of the active groundfish vessels which used a DAS phone-in system in
1995.Wang and Rosenberg 366
Multi-Species Fishery Management Plan Incorporating the Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement, Vols. I, II, IV, September 30.
_. 1996. Amendment 7 to the Northeast Multi-Species Fishery Management Plan Incorpo-
rating the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Vol.. I, II, and IV, February 7.
Rosenberg A., P. Mace, G. Thompson, G. Darcy, W. Clark, J. Collie, W. Gabriel, A. MacCall,
R. Methot, J. Powers, V. Retrepo, T. Wainwright, L. Botsford, J. Hoenig, and K. Stokes.
1994. Scientific Review of Definitions of Overfishing in U.S. Fishery Management
Plans. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-17.
U.S. Department of Commerce (USDC). 1995. Status of Fishery Resources off the Northeast-
ern United States for 1994, NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-108, January.
_. NOAA, NMFS. 1996. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act:
As Amended Through 11 October 1996.
Wang, S.D.H., and A.A. Rosenberg. 1997. U.S. Experience in Implementing Precautionary
Approach to Fisheries Management, Regional Workshop on the Precautionary Approach
to Fisheries Management sponsored by FAO, BOBP and Indonesian Government, 15–18
February 1997, Medan, Indonesia.
Wang, S.D.H. 1993. The U.S. Northeast Groundfish Fishery: Resource Base, Fishing Indus-
try, and Management System. National Marine Fisheries Service. Gloucester MA, De-
cember.